A broad or one-sided support waiver

Questions for the document

What to ask before drawing a conclusion

• What exactly is waived or substituted?
• Which definitions and conditions control?
• Was this version separately reviewed?
• Do current hardship or assistance facts connect to a catalogued safeguard?

Outside evidence

What the agreement cannot prove alone

• Support clauses and redlines
• Disclosure and counsel records
• Proof of substitute benefits
• Historical and current economic circumstances

Alabama

• Barnhill v. Barnhill, 386 So. 2d 749 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980) · Barnhill's first alternative requires adequate consideration and an entire transaction that was fair, just, and equitable from the resisting spouse's point of view; Hollar confirms the framework remains current.
• Barnhill v. Barnhill, 386 So. 2d 749 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980) · Competent independent advice is part of Barnhill's second alternative, while Rhyne-Morris explains that lack of independent counsel is not by itself categorically fatal on every record.

Alaska

• Andrew B. v. Abbie B., 494 P.3d 522 (Alaska 2021) · The focus is not merely whether separate counsel appeared, but whether the party had the ability and opportunity to consult independent counsel in a meaningful way.
• Kilkenny v. Kilkenny, No. S-18602, Opinion No. 7787 (Alaska Sept. 19, 2025) · A court may selectively strike terms made unfair or unreasonable by material changed circumstances without voiding the entire agreement, but it may not add new promises and must explain term-by-term choices sufficiently for appellate review.

Arizona

• A.R.S. § 25-202(D) · A court may require support to the extent necessary to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a premarital support modification or elimination.

Arkansas

• Ark. Code Ann. § 9-11-406(a)(2)(ii) · The disclosure branch asks whether further disclosure was expressly waived in writing after consulting legal counsel.
• Ark. Code Ann. § 9-11-406(b) · A court may require support as necessary to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a support term at separation or dissolution.

California

• Cal. Fam. Code § 1612(c) · California places counsel and unconscionability limits on premarital spousal-support provisions.

Colorado

• C.R.S. § 14-2-309(1)(b), (2) · Access requires reasonable time to decide, locate counsel, obtain and consider advice, plus financial ability or paid reasonable fees when the other party is represented.
• C.R.S. § 14-2-309(1)(c), (3) · Unless represented at signing, a party must receive the prescribed conspicuous notice or a plain-language explanation of modified or waived rights.

Connecticut

• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-36g(a)(4) · Connecticut's enforcement statute asks whether the resisting party was afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult with independent counsel.
• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-36g(b) · A court may require support to the extent necessary to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a premarital support modification or elimination.

Florida

• Fla. Stat. § 61.079(7)(b) · A court may require support to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a support modification or elimination.

Georgia

• Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982) · Scherer's second prong requires the proponent to show that the agreement was not unconscionable, including when the agreement limits spousal support or property remedies.
• Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982) · Scherer's third prong asks whether relevant later facts and circumstances, including unforeseen changes, make enforcement unfair and unreasonable.

Hawaii

• Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572D-6(b) · A court may require support to the extent necessary to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a premarital support modification or elimination at separation or dissolution.
• Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572D-6(a)(2), (c) · The court decides unconscionability as a matter of law; under L.R.O., the statutory branch requires both substantive and procedural unconscionability together with the disclosure conditions.

Idaho

• Idaho Code § 32-925(2) · A court may require support to the extent necessary to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a premarital support modification or elimination at separation or dissolution.

Illinois

• 750 ILCS 10/7(b) · A court may require support to avoid undue hardship from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable when a support provision was executed.

Indiana

• Ind. Code § 31-11-3-8(b) · If a maintenance modification or elimination causes extreme hardship under circumstances not reasonably foreseeable when the agreement was executed, a court may require maintenance only to the extent necessary to avoid that hardship.
• Fetters v. Fetters, 26 N.E.3d 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied · Fetters held an agreement unconscionable on extraordinary facts including the wife's minority, poor reading ability, lack of independent advice and assets, extreme life-experience imbalance, and an entirely one-sided property result.

Kansas

• K.S.A. § 23-2407(b) · A Kansas court may require support to the extent necessary to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a premarital support modification or elimination.
• Davis v. Miller, 269 Kan. 732, 7 P.3d 1223 (2000) · Davis identifies circumstances relevant to voluntariness, disclosure, knowledge, counsel, timing, and bargaining context, and enforced the parties' contractual choice to apply the Kansas Act to the postnuptial agreement before the court.

Kentucky

• Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.200 · Section 403.200 supplies default eligibility, amount, and duration factors for maintenance; a waiver remains subject to the agreement's text and Lane's case-specific unconscionability review.
• Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928, 936 (Ky. 1990) · Gentry requires review for unconscionability, including whether the agreement was manifestly unfair when executed.

Louisiana

• Burtner v. Burtner, 2019-0175 (La. App. 1 Cir. Oct. 1, 2019) · Burtner treated advice to seek independent counsel and the opportunity record as evidence bearing on consent, but Louisiana's matrimonial-agreement articles do not make separate counsel an execution formality.
• McAlpine v. McAlpine, 94-C-1594 (La. Sept. 5, 1996), 679 So. 2d 85 · McAlpine holds that a premarital waiver of permanent post-divorce support is not automatically void as against public policy and may be enforced subject to ordinary contract-rescission grounds.

Maine

• 19-A M.R.S. § 608(2) (2025) · A Maine court may require support to the extent necessary to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a premarital support modification or elimination.

Maryland

• Cannon v. Cannon, 384 Md. 537, 865 A.2d 563 (2005) · Opportunity to obtain independent counsel is an important factor in whether the agreement was voluntarily and understandingly made, but counsel is not a categorical execution formality.
• Cannon v. Cannon, 384 Md. 537, 865 A.2d 563 (2005) · If allowance and waiver terms are unfairly disproportionate at execution, the enforcing party must prove that overreaching did not occur using factors including disclosure, counsel opportunity, and knowing voluntary relinquishment.

Massachusetts

• DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 436 Mass. 18, 762 N.E.2d 797 (2002) · Separate counsel and meaningful review opportunity strongly inform knowing and voluntary execution but are not categorical execution formalities.
• Rudnick v. Rudnick, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 467, 285 N.E.3d 857 (2023) · Rudnick found enforcement unconscionable where breached title promises and the agreement left an elderly spouse without marital property, alimony, or sufficient resources.

Michigan

• Reed v. Reed, 265 Mich. App. 131 (2005); In re Benker Estate, 416 Mich. 681 (1982) · Separate representation, advice opportunity, negotiation, and conflicts materially affect voluntariness and fairness, but counsel is not a categorical formality.
• MCL 552.23(1) · If estates and effects are insufficient for suitable support, a divorce court may award part of the other estate and spousal support as just and reasonable.

Minnesota

• Minn. Stat. § 519.11, subd. 1b(b)(2) · Each party must have a meaningful opportunity to consult independent counsel of that party's choosing.
• Minn. Stat. § 519.11, subd. 1c(a) · Drastically changed circumstances not originally foreseen may make enforcement inconsistent with the parties' reasonable expectations at execution.

Mississippi

• Sanderson v. Sanderson, 170 So. 3d 430 (Miss. 2014); Mabus v. Mabus, 890 So. 2d 806 (Miss. 2003) · Independent counsel is not categorically required, but a reasonable opportunity to consult is important to procedural conscionability.
• Sanderson v. Sanderson, 245 So. 3d 421 (Miss. 2018) · On remand, Sanderson upheld mutually worded property, alimony, allowance, inheritance, and benefit waivers as not harsh, oppressive, or one-sided on that record.

Missouri

• Miles v. Werle, 977 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Gould v. Rafaeli, 822 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) · Access to conflict-free counsel, advice actually received, and the opportunity to revise the draft are important evidence of knowing and voluntary execution.
• Gould v. Rafaeli, 822 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) · A premarital agreement may address maintenance, but enforceability depends on the agreement text, Miles safeguards, and current statutory limits.

Montana

• Mont. Code Ann. § 40-2-608(2) · A court may require support to the extent necessary to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a premarital support modification or elimination at separation or dissolution.
• Mont. Code Ann. § 40-2-608(1)(b), (3) · The court decides execution-time unconscionability as a matter of law, while the statutory public-assistance safeguard remains separately available for qualifying support consequences.

Nebraska

• Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-1006(2) · A court may require support to the extent necessary to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a premarital support modification or elimination at separation or dissolution.
• Edwards v. Edwards, 16 Neb. App. 297, 744 N.W.2d 243 (2008) · Edwards identified the voluntariness considerations later adopted in Mamot, enforced the agreement on its negotiation record, held lack of disclosure alone insufficient without every statutory condition, and applied section 42-1004(1)(d) to temporary as well as permanent support.

Nevada

• NRS 123A.080(1)(b), (3) · Nevada makes unconscionability when the agreement was executed a standalone unenforceability ground, and the court decides the issue as a matter of law.
• NRS 123A.080(2) · A court may require support to the extent necessary to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by an alimony, support, or maintenance modification or elimination at separation or dissolution.

New Hampshire

• MacFarlane v. Rich, 132 N.H. 608 (1989); In the Matter of Nizhnikov, 168 N.H. 525 (2016) · Facts and circumstances may change so substantially after execution that enforcement would create the unconscionable hardship contemplated by New Hampshire precedent.
• In re Estate of Hollett, 150 N.H. 39 (2003) · Counsel's presence is not dispositive when time, complexity, distress, or lack of investigation prevents effective use of the advice.

New Jersey

• N.J. Stat. § 37:2-38(c)(4) · The current unconscionability inquiry lists failure to consult independent counsel together with failure voluntarily and expressly to waive, in writing, the opportunity to consult independent counsel.
• Steele v. McDonnell, 467 N.J. Super. 414, 440–42, 255 A.3d 229 (App. Div. 2021) · Steele explains that the 2013 Act would not govern a 1992 agreement and contrasts the 1988 version's separate enforcement-time unconscionability inquiry with the 2013 execution-time framework.

New Mexico

• N.M. Stat. § 40-3A-4(B) · A New Mexico premarital agreement may not adversely affect a spouse's right to support.
• Rivera v. Rivera, 2010-NMCA-106, 149 N.M. 66, 243 P.3d 1148, cert. denied, 2010-NMCERT-010 · Rivera held the agreement's support-waiver provisions violated section 40-3A-4(B) and were contrary to public policy; because the agreement lacked a severability clause and no severance argument was preserved, the court treated the whole bargain as unconscionable on that record.

New York

• N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236(B)(3)(3) · Maintenance terms are subject to statutory cross-references and fairness/reasonableness and unconscionability language.

North Carolina

• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52B-7(b) · If a support modification or elimination causes public-assistance eligibility at separation or dissolution, a court may order support only to the extent necessary to avoid that eligibility and only after making the dependent-spouse and statutory support findings specified in section 52B-7(b).
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52B-7(a)(2), (c) · The court decides execution-time unconscionability as a matter of law, while the public-assistance support safeguard remains separately available.

North Dakota

• N.D.C.C. § 14-03.2-08(1)(b), (2) · North Dakota requires access to independent legal representation, defined through reasonable time to decide, locate counsel, obtain advice, and consider it, plus financial ability or fee payment when the other party is represented.
• N.D.C.C. § 14-03.2-08(5) · If a support modification or elimination causes public-assistance eligibility at separation or dissolution, a court may order support to the extent necessary to avoid that eligibility.

Ohio

• Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99 (1984); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 68 Ohio St. 3d 464 (1994) · Independent advice and the opportunity to obtain it bear on understanding, free assent, disclosure, and overreaching, although counsel is not stated as a separate Gross condition.
• Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99 (1984) · A divorce-related support provision valid at execution may be reviewed at divorce for unconscionability and reasonableness using the relevant statutory support factors.

Oklahoma

• Griffin v. Griffin, 2004 OK CIV APP 58 · Separate counsel, rejected drafts, negotiated revisions, explanations, and execution records may support free assent, understanding, and fair provision.
• Griffin v. Griffin, 2004 OK CIV APP 58; Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 121 · Oklahoma agreements may address support and divorce payments, subject to Burgess, fraud, contract construction, and current statutory limits.

Oregon

• ORS 108.725(2); 2013 Or. Laws ch. 688, § 12 · A court may require support to the extent necessary to avoid eligibility for public assistance or medical assistance caused by a support modification or elimination at separation or dissolution.
• Annotations to ORS 108.710 and 108.725 · Oregon's official annotations identify Bridge for the necessary-support limit on a spousal-support waiver, Proctor for the limited effect of a construction choice-of-law clause, and Rudder for the statutory meaning of voluntary execution.

Pennsylvania

• 23 Pa.C.S. § 3105(c) · Unless the agreement specifically provides otherwise, provisions addressing existing property rights, alimony, alimony pendente lite, counsel fees, or expenses are not subject to court modification.
• Simeone v. Simeone, 525 Pa. 392, 581 A.2d 162 (1990) · Simeone treats premarital agreements as contracts, rejects a per se independent-counsel requirement, preserves full and fair financial disclosure, and binds parties absent fraud, misrepresentation, or duress.

Rhode Island

• R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-17-6(c) · A court may require support to the extent necessary to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a support modification or elimination at separation or dissolution.
• R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-17-6(d) · The court decides execution-time unconscionability as a matter of law, while the statutory support safeguard remains separately available.

South Carolina

• S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-630(A)(4) · The statutory presumptively-fair treatment references voluntary execution with both parties separately represented by counsel.
• Hardee v. Hardee, 355 S.C. 382, 585 S.E.2d 501 (2003) · Premarital waivers of alimony, support, and attorney fees are not per se unconscionable or automatically against public policy.

South Dakota

• In re Estate of Eichstadt, 2022 S.D. 78 · Eichstadt places the burden on the party avoiding enforcement, reviews voluntariness under the execution circumstances, and requires the separate statutory disclosure findings before an unconscionability ruling.

Tennessee

• Boote v. Shivers, 198 S.W.3d 732, 741 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) · Separate counsel is not an absolute prerequisite, but Tennessee calls it the best assurance and important evidence of knowledgeable, voluntary execution.
• Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777, 782 (Tenn. 1996) · Cary generally enforces alimony waivers entered freely, knowledgeably, in good faith, and without duress, undue influence, or overreaching.

Utah

• Utah Code § 81-3-205(2) · A Utah court may require support to the extent necessary to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a premarital support modification or elimination.

Vermont

• Lacroix v. Rysz, 2025 VT 16 · Independent counsel, advice, negotiation, and understanding are strong evidence bearing on voluntary and informed assent.
• 15 V.S.A. § 752 · Section 752 supplies current maintenance eligibility and amount factors against which a waiver's effect must be assessed.

Virginia

• Va. Code § 20-150(4) · Virginia expressly includes spousal support among the subjects parties may address in a premarital agreement.

Washington

• In re Marriage of Matson, 107 Wn.2d 479 · A substantively unfair agreement requires free execution on independent advice with full knowledge of each spouse's rights.
• RCW 26.09.090 · Section .090 supplies current maintenance factors relevant to the effect and substantive fairness of a waiver.

West Virginia

• W. Va. Code § 48-1A-601(c)–(e) · The court may order support needed to avoid public-assistance eligibility and may refuse a term causing substantial hardship from a material post-signing change.
• Ware v. Ware, 224 W. Va. 599, 687 S.E.2d 382 (2009) · For pre-Act agreements, Ware limits the presumption of validity to agreements where both parties had independent counsel and shifts the validity burden when only one party was represented.

Wisconsin

• Wis. Stat. § 766.58(8) · Joint representation, one-sided representation, or one party's lack of counsel does not by itself make an agreement unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable.
• Wis. Stat. § 766.58(3)(d), (9) · Support may be modified or eliminated, but during marriage a spouse may not be left without necessary and adequate support, and a court may order support needed to avoid public-assistance eligibility at dissolution or death.

Wyoming

• Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 · Section 20-2-114 authorizes reasonable alimony having regard to the other spouse's ability to pay, subject to any valid contractual limitation and current law.