GA · Manually written guide
Georgia's package centers on Scherer v. Scherer, which frames review around defective execution, unconscionability, and changed circumstances that can make enforcement unfair or unreasonable.Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982)
Title 19 supplies the mandatory domestic-relations context, so child-related terms and statutory remedies should be separated from the contract analysis.O.C.G.A. tit. 19, including §§ 19-3-60–66 and 19-9-3
Formation and lifecycle
For agreements governed by the current statute, an antenuptial agreement must be in writing, signed by both parties, and attested by at least two witnesses, one of whom must be a notary public.
O.C.G.A. § 19-3-62One of the at least two attesting witnesses required for a current Georgia antenuptial agreement must be a notary public.
O.C.G.A. § 19-3-62The 2018 enactment defined antenuptial agreements and added today's writing, signature, two-witness, and notary requirements, effective July 1, 2018.
2018 Ga. Laws Act 305 (H.B. 190), §§ 1–5Under the former statutory text, Dove held that a then-existing two-witness marriage-contract rule did not govern divorce-focused premarital agreements and treated Scherer as the enforcement test.
Dove v. Dove, 285 Ga. 647, 680 S.E.2d 839 (2009)The 2020 amendment revised section 19-3-66's cross-references for enforcement by offspring or heirs and became effective January 1, 2021.
2020 Ga. Laws Act 563; O.C.G.A. § 19-3-66Georgia's antenuptial article does not supply a UPAA-style amendment-and-revocation section; a claimed later change must be classified as an amendment, postnuptial settlement, conveyance, or separate contract under then-applicable law.
O.C.G.A. §§ 19-3-60, 19-3-64What the agreement addresses
Georgia defines an antenuptial agreement as a contract entered before marriage that determines the parties' property rights or future settlement issues, including year's support, spousal support, and equitable division; marriage is valuable consideration subject to existing just debts.
O.C.G.A. § 19-3-60Georgia directs liberal construction of antenuptial agreements and provides that lack of form or technical expression does not invalidate an otherwise qualifying agreement.
O.C.G.A. § 19-3-62Georgia provides for equitable enforcement of an antenuptial agreement at the instance of the marriage parties and, after death, specified offspring or heirs under the referenced probate and equity provisions.
O.C.G.A. § 19-3-66Title 19 supplies the current statutory context for antenuptial agreements, support, equitable division, custody, and related mandatory domestic-relations rules.
O.C.G.A. tit. 19, including §§ 19-3-60–66 and 19-9-3A child's right to support cannot be waived by the parents, so a private agreement cannot conclusively eliminate that right.
Swanson v. Swanson, 276 Ga. 566, 580 S.E.2d 526 (2003)Custody and parenting determinations remain subject to the court's statutory best-interests analysis rather than becoming automatically binding through a premarital term.
O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3Scherer's second prong requires the proponent to show that the agreement was not unconscionable, including when the agreement limits spousal support or property remedies.
Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982)Scherer's third prong asks whether relevant later facts and circumstances, including unforeseen changes, make enforcement unfair and unreasonable.
Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982)Georgia's statutory definition expressly includes spousal-support and equitable-division issues, and Arlotta applies Scherer to terms limiting those default-law remedies.
O.C.G.A. § 19-3-60; Arlotta v. Arlotta, A24A0961 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2024)Arlotta described the Scherer criteria as the governing enforceability framework and reversed a ruling that invalidated property and alimony limits merely because they differed from statutory default remedies.
Arlotta v. Arlotta, A24A0961 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2024)Process evidence
A person may voluntarily execute an antenuptial agreement; after marriage a spouse may convey property to the other spouse, subject to the rights of prior purchasers and creditors.
O.C.G.A. § 19-3-64Scherer asks whether the agreement resulted from fraud, duress, mistake, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure of material facts; whether it is unconscionable; and whether later facts and circumstances make enforcement unfair and unreasonable.
Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982)Mallen enforced an agreement first presented roughly nine or ten days before the wedding on its particular record and confirms Georgia has no fixed statutory waiting period.
Mallen v. Mallen, 280 Ga. 43, 622 S.E.2d 812 (2005)Mallen considered the party's consultation with an attorney, the advice received about limited time, and her later negotiation choices; Georgia's statute does not make independent counsel a categorical execution formality.
Mallen v. Mallen, 280 Ga. 43, 622 S.E.2d 812 (2005)Mallen held that general knowledge of the character and extent of assets and income could suffice on its record even without precise income figures and considered the duty to inquire absent fraud or misrepresentation.
Mallen v. Mallen, 280 Ga. 43, 622 S.E.2d 812 (2005)Mallen held that conditioning marriage on execution did not alone establish duress on its record and noted that engaged parties are not automatically treated as being in a confidential relationship.
Mallen v. Mallen, 280 Ga. 43, 622 S.E.2d 812 (2005)Pickren applies Scherer to a record involving financial disclosure, independent counsel, deliberation time, and an alimony waiver.
Pickren v. Campbell, A25A0458 (Ga. Ct. App. 2025)Hypotheticals, not outcomes
These examples show how document facts can intersect with the cited sources. They do not predict a court result.
A long marriage produces financial and caregiving circumstances not contemplated at signing. Scherer's changed-circumstances inquiry makes the enforcement-time record legally relevant.Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982)
Do the later facts satisfy Georgia's current unfairness or unreasonableness standard?
An asset schedule lists a business but omits a material liability. Scherer includes nondisclosure and misrepresentation within the defective-execution inquiry.Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982)
Was the omission material, and what did the other party actually know?
Common starting points
Answers are deliberately scoped to the cited evidence package and should be checked against current law.
The package identifies defective execution, unconscionability, and changed circumstances making enforcement unfair or unreasonable.Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982)
Scherer's first inquiry includes fraud, duress, mistake, misrepresentation, and nondisclosure of material facts.Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982)
Georgia's domestic-relations statutes contain mandatory family-law rules that may limit or supersede contract terms.O.C.G.A. tit. 19, including §§ 19-3-60–66 and 19-9-3
Prepare for independent advice
Bring the agreement, every exhibit, prior drafts, disclosure records, and a signing timeline. Then use the source-linked questions as an interview guide.
Does each disputed provision fit the statutory definition and concern a lawful subject?O.C.G.A. § 19-3-60
Was the agreement executed on or after July 1, 2018, and does the complete instrument satisfy every current formality?O.C.G.A. § 19-3-62
Does the execution page establish attestation by two witnesses including a notary public?O.C.G.A. § 19-3-62
Is the challenge merely technical, or does it concern a mandatory execution or enforcement requirement?O.C.G.A. § 19-3-62
Was execution voluntary under Scherer, and do third-party purchaser or creditor rights affect a later transfer?O.C.G.A. § 19-3-64
Who seeks enforcement, when, and which statutory route and remedy apply?O.C.G.A. § 19-3-66
Which current Title 19 provisions govern or limit the disputed term and requested remedy?O.C.G.A. tit. 19, including §§ 19-3-60–66 and 19-9-3
Does any provision purport to waive or adversely restrict a child's support right?Swanson v. Swanson, 276 Ga. 566, 580 S.E.2d 526 (2003)
Does the agreement attempt to predetermine custody or parenting contrary to the court's current statutory duties?O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3
What evidence addresses each of Scherer's three inquiries?Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982)
Was the agreement unconscionable under the complete Georgia record?Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982)
What material circumstances changed after signing, were they foreseeable, and would enforcement now be unfair and unreasonable?Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982)
What does the complete drafting, negotiation, advice, and wedding chronology show under Scherer?Mallen v. Mallen, 280 Ga. 43, 622 S.E.2d 812 (2005)
What counsel was consulted, what advice was given, and how did the party respond before signing?Mallen v. Mallen, 280 Ga. 43, 622 S.E.2d 812 (2005)
What was accurately disclosed or actually known, and was any material fact concealed or misrepresented?Mallen v. Mallen, 280 Ga. 43, 622 S.E.2d 812 (2005)
Beyond the marriage condition, what facts show or refute improper pressure or another Scherer defect?Mallen v. Mallen, 280 Ga. 43, 622 S.E.2d 812 (2005)
Does the support term fit the agreement and satisfy every Scherer prong?O.C.G.A. § 19-3-60; Arlotta v. Arlotta, A24A0961 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2024)
Did the court apply Scherer to the actual provision rather than invalidate it solely for changing a default remedy?Arlotta v. Arlotta, A24A0961 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2024)
Was the agreement executed before or after July 1, 2018, and which formality regime applies?2018 Ga. Laws Act 305 (H.B. 190), §§ 1–5
Was the agreement executed under Dove-era law or the current post-July 1, 2018 statute?Dove v. Dove, 285 Ga. 647, 680 S.E.2d 839 (2009)
Does the timing and identity of the claimant require historical or current section 19-3-66 analysis?2020 Ga. Laws Act 563; O.C.G.A. § 19-3-66
What legal instrument allegedly changed or superseded the premarital agreement, and does it satisfy the rules governing that transaction?O.C.G.A. §§ 19-3-60, 19-3-64
How does the actual evidence compare with the factors evaluated in Pickren?Pickren v. Campbell, A25A0458 (Ga. Ct. App. 2025)
Known boundaries