States with catalogued prenup financial-disclosure authorities

1. Maryland

   • Cannon v. Cannon, 384 Md. 537, 865 A.2d 563 (2005) · Cannon restates Maryland's antenuptial-agreement framework, including the confidential relationship, enforcement burden, overreaching, disclosure or knowledge, voluntariness, counsel opportunity, and execution-time fairness.
   • Cannon v. Cannon, 384 Md. 537, 865 A.2d 563 (2005) · Full, frank, and truthful disclosure of property and financial interests can establish that the waiving party knew what rights were being relinquished and defeat an overreaching claim.
   4 sources
2. Oklahoma

   • Griffin v. Griffin, 2004 OK CIV APP 58 · Fair disclosure generally requires approximate information about net worth and property character before execution, not invariably exact appraisal-level detail.
   • In re Burgess' Estate, 646 P.2d 623 (Okla. Civ. App. 1982); Griffin v. Griffin, 2004 OK CIV APP 58 · A signer may be bound if the signer had or reasonably should have had general and approximate knowledge of the other's property character and extent.
   4 sources
3. Tennessee

   • In re Estate of Lester Stokes, No. W2021-00249-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2022) · Stokes reversed enforcement because key cash, retirement, insurance, and other interests were omitted and full knowledge was not proved.
   • Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815, 821–22 (Tenn. 1996) · Knowledgeability may be proved through full and fair disclosure of the nature, extent, and value of the proponent's holdings.
   4 sources
4. Alabama

   • Ala. Code § 43-8-72 · A surviving spouse may waive some or all elective-share, homestead-allowance, exempt-property, and family-allowance rights before or after marriage through a written contract, agreement, or waiver signed after fair disclosure.
   • Barnhill v. Barnhill, 386 So. 2d 749 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980) · Barnhill's second alternative requires full knowledge of the interest in the other party's estate and its approximate value; later decisions evaluate whether general knowledge was sufficient on their specific records.
   3 sources
5. Kentucky

   • Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990) · Gentry recognizes divorce-related premarital property agreements that were freely, knowingly, and voluntarily executed after full disclosure, subject to review for defects, unconscionability, and materially changed circumstances.
   • Lawson v. Loid, 896 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1995) · The spouse giving up rights must be fully apprised of the extent and nature of the other estate and the value of the rights surrendered.
   3 sources
6. Michigan

   • Reed v. Reed, 265 Mich. App. 131, 693 N.W.2d 825 (2005) · A Reed nondisclosure challenge must concern a material fact; schedules, actual knowledge, negotiations, and the omission's effect matter.
   • In re Benker Estate, 416 Mich. 681, 331 N.W.2d 193 (1982) · Benker requires a survivor-rights waiver to be fair, equitable, reasonable, voluntary, and understanding after fair disclosure within the parties' confidential relationship.
   3 sources
7. Missouri

   • Miles v. Werle, 977 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) · Missouri's fairness inquiry requires full disclosure of the nature and extent of property interests material to the bargain.
   • Miles v. Werle, 977 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) · Actual knowledge, education, business experience, and participation in drafting may bear on whether the signer understood the disclosed interests and waived rights knowingly.
   3 sources
8. New Jersey

   • N.J. Stat. § 37:2-33 · New Jersey's formality section expressly requires a statement of assets to be annexed to the agreement, independently of the current enforcement section's full-and-fair-disclosure analysis.
   • N.J. Stat. § 37:2-38(c)(1)–(3) · The current unconscionability inquiry lists absence of full and fair disclosure, absence of a voluntary express written waiver of further disclosure, and absence of actual or reasonably available adequate knowledge among its execution-time circumstances.
   3 sources
9. Vermont

   • Bassler v. Bassler, 156 Vt. 353, 593 A.2d 82 (1991) · Bassler supplies Vermont's foundational disclosure, voluntariness, substantive-fairness, and unconscionability requirements.
   • Lacroix v. Rysz, 2025 VT 16, ¶ 12; Bassler v. Bassler, 156 Vt. 353 · Each spouse must make fair and reasonable disclosure of financial status before execution.
   3 sources
10. Alaska

    • Alaska Stat. § 34.77.090(g)–(i) · Section 34.77.090 supplies different enforcement formulations for agreements executed during marriage and before marriage, addressing voluntariness, execution-time unconscionability, disclosure, written waiver, and financial notice; the court decides unconscionability as a matter of law.
    • Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1987) · Material nondisclosure, misrepresentation, fraud, mistake, or duress can defeat enforcement under Brooks; the actual schedules, debts, values, and knowledge record must be preserved.
    2 sources
11. Arkansas

    • Ark. Code Ann. § 9-11-406(a)(2), (c) · The execution-time unconscionability ground also requires no fair disclosure, no qualifying written waiver after consulting counsel, and no adequate financial knowledge.
    • Banks v. Evans, 347 Ark. 383, 64 S.W.3d 746 (2002) · Banks applies section 9-11-406 and evaluates experience, education, financial knowledge, disclosure, waiver, counsel certification, and opportunity to read.
    2 sources
12. Hawaii

    • Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572D-6(a)(2) · Hawaii's execution-time unconscionability branch also requires no fair and reasonable disclosure, no voluntary express written waiver of further disclosure, and no adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.
    • L.R.O. v. N.D.O., 148 Hawai‘i 336, 475 P.3d 1167 (2020) · L.R.O. held that section 572D-6(a)(2) requires both substantive and procedural unconscionability: substantive unconscionability concerns an unjustly disproportionate post-divorce economic result, while procedural unconscionability concerns inadequate financial knowledge at execution.
    2 sources
13. Mississippi

    • Sanderson v. Sanderson, 170 So. 3d 430 (Miss. 2014) · Fair execution ordinarily requires disclosure of each party's financial assets through statements or sufficiently proved independent knowledge.
    • Sanderson v. Sanderson, 170 So. 3d 430 (Miss. 2014) · Fair disclosure may be established by financial statements or the other party's independent knowledge of the financial state.
    2 sources
14. Montana

    • Mont. Code Ann. § 40-2-608(1)(b), (3) · Montana's execution-time unconscionability branch also requires no fair and reasonable disclosure, no voluntary express written waiver of further disclosure, and no adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.
    • In re Marriage of Bliss, 2016 MT 51 · Bliss affirmed enforcement where notarization, original-file evidence, counsel consultation, a later free-will affidavit, and knowledge of omitted low-profit businesses supported voluntariness and fair disclosure.
    2 sources
15. Nevada

    • NRS 123A.080(1)(c) · Nevada separately permits a challenger to prove all three disclosure conditions: no fair and reasonable disclosure before execution, no voluntary express written waiver of further disclosure, and no adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.
    • Fick v. Fick, 109 Nev. 458, 851 P.2d 445 (1993) · Fick affirmed that the agreement's alimony-waiver provisions were unenforceable where the asset schedule was not supplied until after signing and marriage and the record did not establish adequate prior knowledge of the full assets and obligations.
    2 sources
16. New Hampshire

    • In the Matter of Nizhnikov, 168 N.H. 525 (2016) · A challenger must connect an alleged omission or misrepresentation to a material fact and show that the agreement was obtained through that defect.
    • In the Matter of Nizhnikov, 168 N.H. 525 (2016) · The parties' actual knowledge, business involvement, education, translations, and the agreement's disclosure language may bear on a material-nondisclosure claim.
    2 sources
17. New Mexico

    • N.M. Stat. § 40-3A-7(A)(2) · New Mexico's execution-time unconscionability branch also requires no fair and reasonable disclosure, no voluntary express written waiver of further disclosure, and no actual or reasonably available adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.
    • Rivera v. Rivera, 2010-NMCA-106, ¶¶ 16–27, 149 N.M. 66, 243 P.3d 1148 · Rivera applies section 40-3A-7(B) by treating voluntariness and unconscionability as legal questions subject to de novo review and recognized undisputed absence of disclosure, written waiver, and adequate knowledge on its record.
    2 sources
18. North Carolina

    • N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52B-7(a)(2) · North Carolina's execution-time unconscionability branch also requires no fair and reasonable disclosure, no voluntary express written waiver of further disclosure, and no actual or reasonably available adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.
    • Kornegay v. Robinson, 176 N.C. App. 19, 31–33, 625 S.E.2d 805 (2006) · Kornegay found the reciprocal separate-property and support waivers before it were not substantively unconscionable and explained that North Carolina unconscionability analysis requires both substantive and procedural components.
    2 sources
19. Ohio

    • Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99 (1984) · The proponent must establish full disclosure or the other party's full knowledge and understanding of the nature, value, and extent of the proponent's property when the bargain is disproportionate.
    • Fletcher v. Fletcher, 68 Ohio St. 3d 464, 628 N.E.2d 1343 (1994) · When a party receives disproportionately less than equitable distribution would provide, the proponent bears the burden to show full disclosure or full knowledge of assets.
    2 sources
20. Pennsylvania

    • 23 Pa.C.S. § 3106(a)(2) · The disclosure branch requires the challenger to prove all three conditions before execution: no fair and reasonable disclosure, no voluntary express written waiver of additional disclosure, and no adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.
    • Porreco v. Porreco, 571 Pa. 61, 811 A.2d 566 (2002) (opinion announcing judgment) · Porreco concluded that the claimed ring-value misrepresentation lacked justifiable reliance and remanded the distinct confidential-relationship issue.
    2 sources
21. Utah

    • Utah Code § 81-3-205(1)(b), (3) · Utah's second enforcement ground requires fraud at execution together with reasonable-disclosure, written-waiver, and adequate-knowledge conditions.
    • Keyes v. Keyes, 2015 UT App 114 · Keyes holds that fraud is separate from the three disclosure conditions and all four requirements must be satisfied under Utah's statutory fraud ground.
    2 sources
22. Wisconsin

    • Wis. Stat. § 766.58(6)(c) · The resisting spouse may establish nonenforcement by proving both lack of fair and reasonable disclosure under the circumstances and lack of notice of the other spouse's property or financial obligations before execution.
    • Mary A. Kordus v. Daniel Kordus, No. 2008AP111; Button; Schumacher · For Button disclosure review, only actual knowledge of the other party's assets and values substitutes for disclosure; constructive or imputed knowledge is insufficient.
    2 sources
23. Arizona

    • A.R.S. § 25-202(C)(2) · For the statutory unconscionability ground, Arizona also examines fair and reasonable disclosure, written waiver of further disclosure, and adequate knowledge of the other party's property or obligations.
    1 source
24. California

    • Cal. Fam. Code § 1615(a)–(b) · The enforcement framework addresses voluntary execution, unconscionability, disclosure, written waiver, and adequate knowledge.
    1 source
25. Colorado

    • C.R.S. § 14-2-309(1)(d), (4) · Before signing, a party needs reasonably accurate property, liability, and income information plus good-faith values, or adequate knowledge or a reasonable basis for it.
    1 source
26. Connecticut

    • Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-36g(a)(3) · Before execution, Connecticut requires fair and reasonable disclosure of the amount, character, and value of the other party's property, financial obligations, and income for this enforcement safeguard.
    1 source
27. Delaware

    • 13 Del. C. § 326(a)(2) · For Delaware's statutory unconscionability ground, the statute also examines fair and reasonable disclosure, written waiver of further disclosure, and adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.
    1 source
28. Florida

    • Fla. Stat. § 61.079(7)(a) · Florida addresses voluntary execution, fraud, duress, coercion, overreaching, and an unconscionability/disclosure framework.
    1 source
29. Georgia

    • Mallen v. Mallen, 280 Ga. 43, 622 S.E.2d 812 (2005) · Mallen held that general knowledge of the character and extent of assets and income could suffice on its record even without precise income figures and considered the duty to inquire absent fraud or misrepresentation.
    1 source
30. Idaho

    • Idaho Code § 32-925(1)(b), (3) · Idaho's execution-time unconscionability ground also requires all three statutory disclosure conditions: no fair and reasonable disclosure, no voluntary express written waiver, and no adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.
    1 source
31. Illinois

    • 750 ILCS 10/7(a), (c) · Illinois addresses voluntary execution and an unconscionability framework involving disclosure, written waiver, and adequate knowledge.
    1 source
32. Indiana

    • Harrill v. Harrill, 258 N.E.3d 1008, 1014–16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) · Harrill explains that Indiana generally imposes no absolute duty to identify every separate asset, but a duty may arise from unique facts or from the agreement's own disclosure promises; omitted accounts were classified under that agreement's text.
    1 source
33. Iowa

    • Iowa Code § 596.8(1)(c) (2026) · Iowa's disclosure ground examines whether the resisting party received fair and reasonable disclosure and lacked, or reasonably could not have had, adequate knowledge of the other spouse's property or financial obligations.
    1 source
34. Kansas

    • K.S.A. § 23-2407(a)(2), (c) · Kansas's execution-time unconscionability ground also requires all three statutory disclosure conditions: no fair and reasonable disclosure, no voluntary express written waiver, and no adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.
    1 source
35. Louisiana

    • McAlpine v. McAlpine, 679 So. 2d 85 (La. 1996); Crow v. Crow, 56,445-CA (La. App. 2 Cir. Nov. 19, 2025) · Louisiana's matrimonial-agreement articles contain no UPAA-style disclosure safe harbor; asset schedules, representations, and actual knowledge remain important evidence for fraud, error, scope, and informed consent.
    1 source
36. Maine

    • 19-A M.R.S. § 608(1)(B), (3) (2025) · Maine's execution-time unconscionability ground also examines fair and reasonable disclosure, express written waiver, and adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.
    1 source
37. Massachusetts

    • Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 389 N.E.2d 385 (1979) · The waiving party must be informed of the other's worth or have adequate knowledge, and disclosure must permit a reasonable decision whether to proceed.
    1 source
38. Minnesota

    • Minn. Stat. § 519.11, subd. 1b(a)–(b)(1) · Each party must provide reasonably accurate material income facts, good-faith property-value estimates, and the basis for those disclosures; this requirement cannot be waived.
    1 source
39. Nebraska

    • Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-1006(1)(b), (3) · Nebraska's execution-time unconscionability ground also requires all three statutory disclosure conditions: no fair and reasonable disclosure, no voluntary express written waiver, and no adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.
    1 source
40. North Dakota

    • N.D.C.C. § 14-03.2-08(1)(d), (4) · North Dakota defines adequate disclosure through a reasonably accurate description and good-faith value estimate, a separate signed waiver of further disclosure, or adequate knowledge or a reasonable basis for it.
    1 source
41. Oregon

    • ORS 108.725(1)(b), (3) · Oregon's execution-time unconscionability ground also requires all three statutory disclosure conditions: no fair and reasonable disclosure, no voluntary express written waiver, and no adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.
    1 source
42. Rhode Island

    • R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-17-6(a)(2)(i)–(iii) · The challenger must prove no fair and reasonable disclosure, no voluntary express written waiver of additional disclosure, and no actual or reasonably available adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.
    1 source
43. South Carolina

    • S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-630(A)(4) · The statutory presumptively-fair treatment references full disclosure of income, debts, and assets.
    1 source
44. South Dakota

    • S.D. Codified Laws § 25-2-21(a)(2), (b) · South Dakota's execution-time unconscionability ground also requires all three statutory disclosure conditions: no fair and reasonable disclosure, no voluntary express written waiver, and no adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.
    1 source
45. Texas

    • Tex. Fam. Code § 4.006 · Texas addresses voluntary signing and an unconscionability framework involving disclosure, written waiver, and adequate knowledge.
    1 source
46. Virginia

    • Va. Code § 20-151(A)(2)–(B) · For Virginia's statutory unconscionability ground, the statute examines fair and reasonable disclosure and voluntary, express written waiver of disclosure beyond what was provided; agreement recitations create a prima facie presumption of factual correctness.
    1 source
47. Washington

    • In re Marriage of Matson, 107 Wn.2d 479 · Procedural fairness requires full disclosure of the amount, character, and value of property involved.
    1 source
48. West Virginia

    • W. Va. Code § 48-1A-601(a)(3), (b) · Adequate disclosure may rest on a reasonably accurate description and good-faith value estimate of property, liabilities, and income, a separate signed waiver, or adequate knowledge or a reasonable basis for it.
    1 source
49. Wyoming

    • Lund v. Lund, 849 P.2d 731, 737–41 (Wyo. 1993) · Lund's record addressed whether a later amendment followed full disclosure of the nature, extent, and value of property and required a legally reviewable rationale.
    1 source

Matrix and list placement describes the records in PrenupsAI's current evidence packages. It does not rank legal strictness, predict enforceability, or mean that an unlisted state has no applicable rule. Open the cited sources to inspect the underlying authority.