50-state evidence matrix

Voluntariness and prenup enforcement

Catalogued statutes and decisions that identify voluntariness or related enforcement inquiries.

45 states have 81 separately catalogued authority records for this topic. 5 states show a visible coverage gap.

50states shown

45with evidence records

81matching authorities

5visible gaps

Manual editorial field guide

Voluntariness cannot be read from a recital saying ‘voluntary.’ It is a factual inquiry built from the negotiation timeline, available choices, communication, capacity, language access, pressure, and the state authority that frames the issue.

410 manually authored words · evidence tables continue below

Replace impressions with a chronology

Record when the idea was raised, when each draft arrived, what changed, when disclosures were delivered, when counsel became involved, and what wedding or travel commitments existed. Use timestamped records where possible. ‘Last minute’ is a conclusion; ‘the first full draft was emailed at 10:14 p.m. three days before the ceremony’ is a fact that can be evaluated.

Chronology also reveals breathing room. A compressed final signature may follow months of negotiation, or a document delivered early may change materially on the last day. Identify substantive revisions rather than counting calendar days alone.

Map choices and constraints

Ask what alternatives each person realistically had. Could the wedding be postponed? Was independent counsel available? Were immigration, pregnancy, health, housing, or family pressures present? Was a translation needed? Did anyone threaten consequences outside ordinary bargaining? These questions are sensitive, so the report should attribute statements and distinguish contemporaneous records from later recollections.

Do not assume unequal wealth, a hard bargain, or emotional stress proves involuntariness. Do not assume a signed recital disproves it. The evidence should be organized neutrally enough that competing explanations remain visible.

Connect process to the actual draft

Advice and disclosure must be tied to the version that mattered. A lawyer may have reviewed an earlier draft before a support waiver, remedy, or schedule changed. A translation may cover only a summary. A party may acknowledge receipt without evidence of when or how the material arrived. Version control is therefore part of voluntariness analysis.

A credible output identifies strong records, disputed facts, missing evidence, and the exact state sources relevant to the inquiry. It never declares a person coerced or an agreement voluntary based solely on text extraction.

Questions for the document

What to ask before drawing a conclusion

When did each complete and materially different draft reach each party and adviser?
What practical choices, constraints, language needs, and external pressures existed at each stage?
Which provisions changed after advice or disclosure was given?
What parts of the account are contemporaneously documented, disputed, or based only on later memory?

Outside evidence

What the agreement cannot prove alone

Native draft files, redlines, email threads, messages, calendars, and signature logs
Wedding contracts, travel records, postponement options, and other timing constraints
Counsel engagement records, advice dates, translation records, and accessibility accommodations
Contemporaneous notes and communications concerning pressure, questions, objections, or proposed changes

State	Coverage	Citations and scoped summaries	Next step
Alabama (AL) al-2026-07-22.3	2 sources	Barnhill v. Barnhill, 386 So. 2d 749 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980) The proponent may satisfy Barnhill by showing either adequate consideration and a transaction fair, just, and equitable from the other spouse's perspective, or free and voluntary execution with competent independent advice and full knowledge of the interest in the estate and its approximate value. Hollar v. Hollar, CL-2022-1230 (Ala. Civ. App. Nov. 9, 2023) Hollar affirmed nonenforcement where the trial court could find that the wife did not voluntarily sign and that the agreement was not fair under Barnhill.	Open AL checklist →
Alaska (AK) ak-2026-07-23.3	2 sources	Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1987) Brooks recognizes legally procured and ostensibly fair premarital agreements and asks about fraud, duress, mistake, misrepresentation or material nondisclosure, execution-time unconscionability, and changed circumstances making enforcement unfair or unreasonable. Andrew B. v. Abbie B., 494 P.3d 522 (Alaska 2021) Andrew requires a combined, fact-specific evaluation of time to review, ability and opportunity to consult independent counsel meaningfully, and ability to understand the agreement; no single factor is dispositive and ordinary duress is not the exclusive test.	Open AK checklist →
Arizona (AZ) az-2026-07-20.3	1 source	A.R.S. § 25-202(C)(1) The party resisting enforcement may prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily.	Open AZ checklist →
Arkansas (AR) ar-2026-07-22.3	2 sources	Ark. Code Ann. § 9-11-406(a)(1) A resisting party may prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily. Mays v. Mullins, 2018 Ark. App. 200 Mays affirmed enforcement after reviewing signature and witness proof, credibility, disclosed assets, knowledge, and the separate voluntariness and unconscionability paths.	Open AR checklist →
California (CA) ca-2026-07-18.3	No separate record	The package does not encode this as a standalone topic. No legal absence is inferred.	Open CA checklist →
Colorado (CO) co-2026-07-22.3	1 source	C.R.S. § 14-2-309(1)(a) An agreement is unenforceable if the resisting party proves consent was involuntary or resulted from duress.	Open CO checklist →
Connecticut (CT) ct-2026-07-21.3	1 source	Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-36g(a)(1) A Connecticut premarital agreement or amendment is not enforceable if the resisting party proves that it was not executed voluntarily.	Open CT checklist →
Delaware (DE) de-2026-07-21.3	1 source	13 Del. C. § 326(a)(1) The party resisting enforcement may prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily.	Open DE checklist →
Florida (FL) fl-2026-07-18.3	No separate record	The package does not encode this as a standalone topic. No legal absence is inferred.	Open FL checklist →
Georgia (GA) ga-2026-07-22.3	3 sources	O.C.G.A. § 19-3-64 A person may voluntarily execute an antenuptial agreement; after marriage a spouse may convey property to the other spouse, subject to the rights of prior purchasers and creditors. Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982) Scherer asks whether the agreement resulted from fraud, duress, mistake, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure of material facts; whether it is unconscionable; and whether later facts and circumstances make enforcement unfair and unreasonable. Mallen v. Mallen, 280 Ga. 43, 622 S.E.2d 812 (2005) Mallen held that conditioning marriage on execution did not alone establish duress on its record and noted that engaged parties are not automatically treated as being in a confidential relationship.	Open GA checklist →
Hawaii (HI) hi-2026-07-22.3	1 source	Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572D-6(a)(1) The party resisting enforcement may prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily as an alternative to the statute's unconscionability-and-disclosure branch.	Open HI checklist →
Idaho (ID) id-2026-07-22.3	1 source	Idaho Code § 32-925(1)(a) The party resisting enforcement in Idaho may prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily.	Open ID checklist →
Illinois (IL) il-2026-07-18.3	No separate record	The package does not encode this as a standalone topic. No legal absence is inferred.	Open IL checklist →
Indiana (IN) in-2026-07-22.3	1 source	Ind. Code § 31-11-3-8(a), (c) The party resisting enforcement must prove either involuntary execution or that the agreement was unconscionable when executed; the court decides unconscionability as a matter of law.	Open IN checklist →
Iowa (IA) ia-2026-07-22.3	2 sources	Iowa Code § 596.8(1)(a)–(b) (2026) The party resisting enforcement in Iowa may prove that execution was not voluntary or that the agreement was unconscionable when executed. In re Marriage of Shanks, 758 N.W.2d 506 (Iowa 2008) Shanks interprets Iowa chapter 596's voluntariness and unconscionability standards and held the agreement before it voluntarily executed, conscionable, and enforceable.	Open IA checklist →
Kansas (KS) ks-2026-07-22.3	1 source	K.S.A. § 23-2407(a)(1) The party resisting enforcement in Kansas may prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily.	Open KS checklist →
Kentucky (KY) ky-2026-07-23.3	1 source	Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928, 936 (Ky. 1990) Gentry's first criterion asks whether fraud, duress, mistake, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure of material facts affected the agreement.	Open KY checklist →
Louisiana (LA) la-2026-07-23.3	4 sources	La. Civ. Code art. 2329 Spouses may agree before or during marriage on matters not prohibited by public policy, but a during-marriage modification or termination generally requires a joint petition and findings that it serves their best interests and that they understand the governing rules. La. Civ. Code art. 1948 Consent to a contract may be vitiated by error, fraud, or duress, and those conventional-obligation grounds apply to matrimonial agreements alongside their special form rules. La. Civ. Code art. 1959 Duress vitiates consent when it causes reasonable fear of unjust and considerable injury to person, property, or reputation, considering the party's age, health, disposition, and other personal circumstances. McAlpine v. McAlpine, 94-C-1594 (La. Sept. 5, 1996), 679 So. 2d 85 A support-waiving antenuptial agreement remains subject to the same rescission grounds as other contracts, and McAlpine upheld the agreement after rejecting undue duress on its record.	Open LA checklist →
Maine (ME) me-2026-07-22.3	1 source	19-A M.R.S. § 608(1)(A) (2025) The party resisting enforcement in Maine may prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily.	Open ME checklist →
Maryland (MD) md-2026-07-23.3	3 sources	Cannon v. Cannon, 384 Md. 537, 865 A.2d 563 (2005) Because of the confidential relationship, the party seeking enforcement bears the ultimate burden of proving the agreement's validity and absence of overreaching. Cannon v. Cannon, 384 Md. 537, 865 A.2d 563 (2005); Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865 (1967) The central inquiry is whether unfairness or inequity existed in the result or procurement within the confidential relationship, including substantive commensurateness and free, understanding assent. Cannon v. Cannon, 384 Md. 537, 865 A.2d 563 (2005) Like other contracts, antenuptial agreements may be attacked for fraud, duress, coercion, mistake, undue influence, incompetence, or execution-time unconscionability.	Open MD checklist →
Massachusetts (MA) ma-2026-07-23.3	2 sources	DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 436 Mass. 18, 762 N.E.2d 797 (2002) DeMatteo requires a first look at execution-time fairness and reasonableness and a second look at enforcement-time conscionability. DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 436 Mass. 18, 762 N.E.2d 797 (2002) The first look considers knowledge, disclosure, waiver language, counsel, review opportunity, understanding, and absence of overreaching.	Open MA checklist →
Michigan (MI) mi-2026-07-23.3	2 sources	Reed v. Reed, 265 Mich. App. 131, 693 N.W.2d 825 (2005) Reed permits avoidance for fraud, duress, mistake, misrepresentation, or material nondisclosure; execution-time unconscionability; or unforeseeable later changes making enforcement unfair. Reed v. Reed, 265 Mich. App. 131, 693 N.W.2d 825 (2005) Reed's first branch asks whether fraud, duress, mistake, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure of material fact affected execution.	Open MI checklist →
Minnesota (MN) mn-2026-07-23.3	2 sources	Minn. Stat. § 519.11, subd. 1b Current procedural fairness requires full disclosure, meaningful counsel opportunity, exact formalities, voluntary execution free of duress, and execution at least seven days before marriage. Minn. Stat. § 519.11, subd. 1b(b)(4) Current law expressly requires that the agreement be entered into voluntarily and free of duress.	Open MN checklist →
Mississippi (MS) ms-2026-07-23.3	3 sources	Sanderson v. Sanderson, 170 So. 3d 430 (Miss. 2014), modified on rehearing (2015) Sanderson treats premarital agreements as contracts with heightened execution fairness, voluntary assent, disclosure, and both procedural and substantive unconscionability review. Estate of Hensley v. Estate of Hensley, 524 So. 2d 325 (Miss. 1988); Sanderson v. Sanderson, 170 So. 3d 430 (Miss. 2014) Premarital agreements carry a heightened requirement of fairness in execution, including voluntariness and financial disclosure. Sanderson v. Sanderson, 170 So. 3d 430 (Miss. 2014) Voluntariness turns on coercion, surprise, counsel opportunity, disclosure, signing proximity, and the actual wedding circumstances.	Open MS checklist →
Missouri (MO) mo-2026-07-23.3	3 sources	Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.220 annotations; Miles v. Werle, 977 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) Miles supplies the modern Missouri formulation for voluntary, fair, knowing, understanding, good-faith execution with full disclosure and absence of unconscionability. Miles v. Werle, 977 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) A Missouri premarital agreement must be entered freely, fairly, knowingly, understandingly, in good faith and with full disclosure, and it must not be unconscionable. Whitenton v. Whitenton, 659 S.W.2d 542 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Wilson v. Wilson, 354 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962) Threats, wedding pressure, bargaining disparity, concealment, and overreaching may undermine the free and fair execution Missouri requires.	Open MO checklist →
Montana (MT) mt-2026-07-22.3	2 sources	Mont. Code Ann. § 40-2-608(1)(a) The party resisting enforcement may prove involuntary execution as an alternative to Montana's unconscionability-and-disclosure branch. In re Marriage of Stout/Gollehon, 261 Mont. 10, 861 P.2d 856 (1993) Stout-Gollehon confirms the October 1, 1987 applicability line and rejected involuntariness based only on ignorance of a spouse's future conduct where the agreement was proposed by the challenger and drafted by her attorney.	Open MT checklist →
Nebraska (NE) ne-2026-07-22.3	2 sources	Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-1006(1)(a) The party resisting enforcement in Nebraska bears the burden to prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily. Mamot v. Mamot, 283 Neb. 659, 813 N.W.2d 440 (2012) Mamot adopted the premarital voluntariness considerations developed in Edwards and held the agreement involuntary on its record, including presentation days before the wedding, inadequate opportunity for independent counsel, bargaining inequality, and lack of understanding.	Open NE checklist →
Nevada (NV) nv-2026-07-22.3	2 sources	NRS 123A.080(1)(a) The party resisting enforcement in Nevada bears the burden to prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily. Kantor v. Kantor, 116 Nev. 886, 8 P.3d 825 (2000) Kantor explains that section 123A.080 places the burden of proving statutory invalidity on the party resisting enforcement and held that the district court did not need to independently revisit validity after the wife admitted it in an amended answer.	Open NV checklist →
New Hampshire (NH) nh-2026-07-23.3	3 sources	MacFarlane v. Rich, 132 N.H. 608, 567 A.2d 585 (1989); In the Matter of Nizhnikov, 168 N.H. 525 (2016) A premarital agreement is presumed valid unless the challenger proves procurement through fraud, duress, mistake, misrepresentation or material nondisclosure; unconscionability; or sufficiently changed circumstances. In re Estate of Hollett, 150 N.H. 39 (2003) Because premarital bargains implicate a confidential relationship and state interests, Hollett requires heightened scrutiny, good faith, candor, sincerity, and fairness in terms and execution. In re Estate of Hollett, 150 N.H. 39 (2003) Hollett held the signing involuntary as a matter of law on its cumulative facts, including late disclosure, complexity, unequal bargaining power, emotional distress, and wedding pressure.	Open NH checklist →
New Jersey (NJ) nj-2026-07-22.3	1 source	N.J. Stat. § 37:2-38(a), (c)–(d); P.L.2013, c.72, § 2 The challenger bears the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence either involuntary execution or execution-time unconscionability tied to the circumstances listed in subsection c; the court decides unconscionability as a matter of law.	Open NJ checklist →
New Mexico (NM) nm-2026-07-22.3	2 sources	N.M. Stat. § 40-3A-7(A)(1) The party resisting enforcement may prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily as an alternative to the statute's execution-time unconscionability-and-disclosure branch. N.M. Stat. § 40-3A-7(B) New Mexico directs the court to decide both voluntariness and unconscionability as matters of law.	Open NM checklist →
New York (NY) ny-2026-07-18.3	No separate record	The package does not encode this as a standalone topic. No legal absence is inferred.	Open NY checklist →
North Carolina (NC) nc-2026-07-22.3	1 source	N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52B-7(a)(1) The party resisting enforcement may prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily as an alternative to the statute's execution-time unconscionability-and-disclosure branch.	Open NC checklist →
North Dakota (ND) nd-2026-07-22.3	1 source	N.D.C.C. § 14-03.2-08(1)(a) A North Dakota premarital or marital agreement is unenforceable if the resisting party proves consent was involuntary or the result of duress.	Open ND checklist →
Ohio (OH) oh-2026-07-23.3	2 sources	Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 464 N.E.2d 500 (1984) Gross requires free execution without fraud, duress, coercion, or overreaching; full disclosure or full knowledge and understanding of property; and terms that do not promote divorce or profiteering by divorce. Zimmie v. Zimmie, 11 Ohio St. 3d 94, 464 N.E.2d 142 (1984) Zimmie invalidated an agreement on a record involving wedding-eve presentation, lack of financial disclosure, and inadequate understanding of relinquished rights.	Open OH checklist →
Oklahoma (OK) ok-2026-07-23.3	2 sources	In re Burgess' Estate, 646 P.2d 623 (Okla. Civ. App. 1982); Griffin v. Griffin, 2004 OK CIV APP 58 An Oklahoma agreement is enforceable if it makes fair and reasonable provision for the resisting party, or full, fair and frank disclosure was made, or that party had generally accurate knowledge of the other's worth. Griffin v. Griffin, 2004 OK CIV APP 58 Antenuptial agreements may be avoided for fraud, duress, coercion, overreaching, or comparable contract defects; fraud must satisfy its distinct elements and proof standard.	Open OK checklist →
Oregon (OR) or-2026-07-22.3	1 source	ORS 108.725(1)(a) The party resisting enforcement in Oregon bears the burden to prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily.	Open OR checklist →
Pennsylvania (PA) pa-2026-07-22.3	1 source	23 Pa.C.S. § 3106(a)(1) The party seeking to set aside a premarital agreement bears the burden to prove involuntary execution by clear and convincing evidence.	Open PA checklist →
Rhode Island (RI) ri-2026-07-22.3	1 source	R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-17-6(a)–(b) The challenger must prove involuntary execution and execution-time unconscionability together with all three disclosure, waiver, and knowledge conditions; every required element carries a clear-and-convincing evidence burden.	Open RI checklist →
South Carolina (SC) sc-2026-07-23.3	3 sources	Holler v. Holler, 364 S.C. 256, 612 S.E.2d 469 (Ct. App. 2005) Holler applies safeguards against duress, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, overreaching, and unconscionability. Holler v. Holler, 364 S.C. 256, 267–69, 612 S.E.2d 469, 475–76 (Ct. App. 2005) Holler asks whether coercion created fear of material harm, destroyed free agency, and caused an act not otherwise performed. Holler v. Holler, 364 S.C. 256, 612 S.E.2d 469 (Ct. App. 2005) Limited English proficiency, lack of explanation or translation, and the signing setting may bear on voluntary and informed execution.	Open SC checklist →
South Dakota (SD) sd-2026-07-22.3	1 source	S.D. Codified Laws § 25-2-21(a)(1) The party resisting enforcement in South Dakota may prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily.	Open SD checklist →
Tennessee (TN) tn-2026-07-23.3	5 sources	Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-501 A premarital agreement concerning premarital property is binding only if entered freely, knowledgeably, in good faith, and without duress or undue influence. Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815, 821 (Tenn. 1996) The party seeking enforcement must prove the statutory prerequisites by a preponderance of the evidence. Boote v. Shivers, 198 S.W.3d 732, 741, 746 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) Each statutory element is determined from the totality surrounding negotiation and execution, not the signature moment alone. Boote v. Shivers, 198 S.W.3d 732, 748–50 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) Duress involves unlawful restraint, intimidation, or compulsion so severe that it overcomes ordinary free will, assessed in the broader context. Walker v. Walker, No. M2018-01140-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020) Walker affirmed nonenforcement where the proponent failed to prove good faith after omitting a sensitive property interest.	Open TN checklist →
Texas (TX) tx-2026-07-18.3	No separate record	The package does not encode this as a standalone topic. No legal absence is inferred.	Open TX checklist →
Utah (UT) ut-2026-07-22.3	2 sources	Utah Code § 81-3-205(1)(a) The party resisting enforcement in Utah may prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily. Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, 984 P.2d 987 Reese recognizes binding agreements between spouses or prospective spouses when negotiations satisfy Utah's heightened expectations of good faith, honesty, and candor.	Open UT checklist →
Vermont (VT) vt-2026-07-23.3	1 source	Lacroix v. Rysz, 2025 VT 16, ¶¶ 12–17 Lacroix restates four distinct Bassler requirements: fair financial disclosure, voluntary and free assent, substantively fair property terms, and no unconscionability.	Open VT checklist →
Virginia (VA) va-2026-07-21.3	1 source	Va. Code § 20-151(A)(1) A Virginia premarital agreement is not enforceable if the resisting party proves that the agreement was not executed voluntarily.	Open VA checklist →
Washington (WA) wa-2026-07-23.3	3 sources	In re Marriage of Matson, 107 Wn.2d 479, 730 P.2d 668 (1986) Washington first tests substantive fairness; an unfair agreement may still be enforced only if procedural fairness is proved. In re Marriage of Matson, 107 Wn.2d at 483–87 For a substantively unfair agreement, the proponent must prove full property disclosure and free execution on independent advice with full knowledge of rights. In re Marriage of Bernard, 165 Wn.2d 895, 902, 204 P.3d 907 (2009) The spouse seeking enforcement bears the burden under Washington's premarital-agreement framework.	Open WA checklist →
West Virginia (WV) wv-2026-07-23.5	2 sources	W. Va. Code § 48-1A-601(a)(1) The party resisting enforcement may prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily. Harton v. Harton, 23-ICA-242 (W. Va. Ct. App. June 11, 2024) Harton confirms that the 2023 Act does not govern an older agreement and applies surviving Gant procurement principles together with Ware's counsel-dependent burden rule.	Open WV checklist →
Wisconsin (WI) wi-2026-07-23.3	1 source	Wis. Stat. § 766.58(6)(b) A marital-property agreement is not enforceable if the resisting spouse proves that execution was not voluntary.	Open WI checklist →
Wyoming (WY) wy-2026-07-23.3	1 source	Bradley v. Bradley, 2005 WY 107 Wyoming divorce records may require proof that the agreement and any amendment were voluntary, fair, and supported by financial disclosure before enforcement.	Open WY checklist →

Matrix and list placement describes the records in PrenupsAI's current evidence packages. It does not rank legal strictness, predict enforceability, or mean that an unlisted state has no applicable rule. Open the cited sources to inspect the underlying authority.